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460 Abstract
This article is a critical assessment of the implementation frameworks of Agenda 
2030 in the Arab region through a study of the deficiencies pertaining to the con-
textualization of the Agenda in the region. Seeking to identify the scope of imple-
mentation that would allow for the eventual streamlining of action towards the 
achievement of all of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the authors 
argue that the region’s political and institutional context is one of peacebuilding 
and resilience-building, imposing several overarching considerations pertaining 
to the priority intervention areas. Drawing on the findings of Ianovichina (2018), 
the article identifies the key levers of peacebuilding as being the reduction of real 
inequalities, the resumption of public and social services, and the promotion of 
equity and the rule of law. It then explores the policy deficiencies underlying the 
mobilization of these key levers. While domestic resources mobilization remains 
crippled by political exclusiveness and institutional inefficiency, the implementa-
tion of foreign financing frameworks intrinsically depends on that said mobiliza-
tion. The authors conclude with a “roadmap” for improvements in the contextu-
alization of Agenda 2030 by focusing on fiscal and financial reform and on the 
curbing of illicit financial flows on one hand, and de-escalation and institutional 
peacebuilding on the other. 
Keywords: Agenda 2030, Arab world, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
peacebuilding, financing development, sustainable development
1 INTRODUCTION
Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has become the 
leading framework for development and development financing. Consequently, 
they will come to define the aid aspect of foreign policy across the OECD Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC) countries but also within the global South. 
With a global economy estimated at USD 79.98 trillion and steady expansion and 
upturn recorded since mid-2016 (Niculescu, 2017) most types of development 
financing flows have also increased in 2017, hence realizing progress across all of 
the action areas outlined in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (United Nations, 
2018). Yet despite the global momentum for the achievement of the SDGs, the 
contextualization of Agenda 2030 remains challenging conceptually and in prac-
tice, particularly in what relates to its compatibility with the current background 
of countries and regions. 
Firstly, the framework is itself facing criticism (Ehmsen and Scharenberg, 2015) 
concerning the extent to which it embodies any actual “departure” from the older 
politically driven foreign aid and modernization frameworks. Ehmsen and 
Scharenberg (2015) have also underlined that a severe lag in contextualization 
would greatly impact its achievability. Secondly, several regions and countries are 
witnessing unprecedented conflicts that are often at odds with attempts at imple-
menting Agenda 2030. Such is the case in the Arab countries, which are experi-
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461political risks incurred by domestic economies in the region are also more likely 
to increase with both environmental hazards and the scarcity of natural resources, 
thereby rendering it a breeding ground for further poverty and social unrest (Hus-
sein, 2008). In view of such considerations, the Arab region is left with the imper-
ative to exit fragility, and all of its countries have adopted Agenda 2030 as the 
corresponding development framework (United Nations, 2019).
Nevertheless, how this international development agenda can be translated into an 
action plan corresponding to the region’s priorities and urgent action areas has 
been poorly studied. The Agenda needs to address the region’s pressing needs 
particularly since it will shape development aid patterns for the decade to come, 
consequently mobilizing billions from both domestic and foreign resources. This 
article argues that Agenda 2030 and its SDGs, as action areas and means of imple-
mentation, will need to be contextualized to the Arab world through the identifica-
tion of key “entry points”. Such “entry points” have been recently identified by 
Ianchovichina (2018), and overlap with the latest literature on international devel-
opment and the implementation of Agenda 2030 (United Nations Committee for 
Development Policy, 2019), as will be evidenced in parts 3 and 4, thereby render-
ing the elaboration of a corresponding implementation framework based on such 
entry points possible. 
The “peacebuilding framework” proposed in this article addresses three interre-
lated goal areas that can serve as starting points (“key levers”) for policy action for 
the achievement of all other SDGs: (1) real inequalities (SDG 10), (2) the degra-
dation of public and social services (SDGs 3, 4, 6), and (3) lack of equity and rule 
of law (SDG 16). In line with this argumentation, the article explores, in part 5, the 
policy mechanisms, particularly in terms of financing, that have so far hindered 
the addressing of these deficiencies. It is concluded that two underlying and inter-
connected deficiencies will need to be addressed in order to achieve progress 
towards this framework: political inclusiveness and domestic resources mobiliza-
tion. This interconnected framework from which a greater streamlining of policy 
action towards the achieving of the SDGs is possible is presented as an Annex.
2 AGENDA 2030 AND THE ARAB WORLD
2.1 CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
The centerpiece of development programs for the decade to come, Agenda 2030 is 
expected to “require around USD 6 trillion per annum or USD 90 trillion [in total] 
over 15 years” and is most likely to mobilize public, private, civil society, and inter-
national organizations (Thomson, 2018). In 2015, implementation directives for the 
Agenda were published and entitled the Addis Ababa Action Plan (United Nations, 
2015). Nevertheless, the promotion of Agenda 2030 has not been free from criti-
cism. Detractors have focused principally on the fact that it outlined too many 
impractical, conflicting, and irreconcilable goals, and that it constitutes a “repack-
aging” of older modernization frameworks (Ehmsen and Scharenberg, 2015), 
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462 world. Despite the universal nature of the Agenda, poor contextualization by coun-
tries engaged in its achievement could corroborate such claims, as the disengage-
ment of local, national and regional actors would inevitably imply relegating the 
elaboration of implementation frameworks to donors and actors from the “Global 
North”. This critique is particularly relevant in the Arab world, where the adoption 
of the SDGs is occurring in a context of interventions and geopolitical tensions. 
For the Arab region, the current trends pertaining to the adoption and implementa-
tion of the Agenda are characterized by their broadness and poor contextualiza-
tion: while the outcome document of the Arab Forum for Sustainable Develop-
ment of 2018 held at the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
(ESCWA) in Beirut stressed the “necessity of adapting the SDGs to national con-
texts”, the report provided a large set of recommendations and commitments that 
seem to overlook the centrality of conflicts, wars and popular unrest as the largest 
threat to the achievement of the SDGs (ESCWA, 2018b). If one framed such defi-
ciencies within the global criticism presented by Ehmsen and Scharenberg (2015), 
Agenda 2030 could eventually (1) remain donor-led, (2) reinforce existing uneven 
dynamics between core and periphery, (3) become irrelevant due to the inherent 
contradiction between its spoken intentions and the foreign policies implemented 
by its leading state and non-state actors.
2.2 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the conflict-ridden context, most of Arab countries have shown commit-
ment towards achieving the SDGs. Moreover, and since the launch of the High-
Level Political Forum (HLPF) in 2016, 10 out of 22 Arab states have submitted their 
voluntary national reviews (VNRs) in order to document progress achieved (United 
Nations, 2019). Consequently, by 2019, more than half, i.e. 16 Arab countries would 
have become fully committed and engaged in the realization of Agenda 2030.
Table 1
Voluntary national reviews from the Arab world



















Source: United Nations (2019). 
Nevertheless, the “progress” documented remains, in many cases, inconclusive. 
Several civil societies “shadow VNRs” have underlined several shortfalls in rela-
tion to progress achieved towards realizing the Agenda (Transparency Inter-
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463intervention or occupation, which makes several principles of effective govern-
ance that are a cornerstone for the achievement of the SDGs, such as efficiency in 
the case of the State of Palestine, non-applicable (State of Palestine, 2018). Rec-
ommendations from several VNRs concerning SDG-16, such as that of the King-
dom of Bahrain, underline the extent to which foreign interference is a concern, 
thereby demonstrating a growing disconnect between the Agenda’s liberal outlook 
and the overall realpolitik climate of the region (Kingdom of Bahrain, 2018). 
Finally, the key messages of the Arab Forum for Sustainable Development (AFSD) 
of 2016, 2017, 2018, have focused on engagement and participation, climate 
change and environmental sustainability, work and employment, and gender equal-
ity, tending thereby to overlook the overarching threat to progress on any of these 
core areas: popular unrest, fragility, and conflicts (Youssef, 2018). The regional 
priorities for 2018 were identified as being economic diversification, particularly 
with respect to natural resources, resilient and sustainable cities, civil society and 
women’s empowerment, as well as the empowerment of youth and local communi-
ties (ESCWA, 2018b:10-15). In 2019, the AFSD, also held at the ESCWA, focused 
on inclusiveness and the reduction of inequalities (ESCWA, 2019a). While all of 
these action areas are central to the achievement of the SDGs, it will be argued that 
given the political context of the Arab world, the starting point for “breaking up the 
silos” and streamlining action towards the achievement of the SDGs are to be 
found in the recommendations of the AFSD of 2019 concerning inclusiveness and 
the reduction of inequalities, and that such recommendations require further con-
textualization, development, and overarching considerations. 
3 PROBLEM ANALYSIS
Despite the importance of the recommendations of the AFSD in the 2016-2018 
period, the region’s conflicts and instability continue to cloud the prospects of 
economic and social well-being and tighten the noose on Arab countries. Actions 
for engagement, work and employment, climate action and gender empowerment 
remain elusive when the region of the Arab world remains the world’s least peace-
ful (IEP, 2018:6). Moreover, it has been estimated that institutions may take 
between 15 to 30 years to recover fully from conflicts, thereby rendering action on 
such areas extremely difficult to achieve (UNDP, 2014:17). Also, foreign policies 
implemented by both DAC and several of the region’s countries have a question-
able track record with respect to their pledges towards supporting development 
aid in the region outside of immediate state interests; while others have contrib-
uted outright, through the unfortunate reality of global and regional politics, to the 
destabilization of the region.
3.1 COSTS OF CONFLICT
Every day, conflicts cost the region millions of USD that could have otherwise 
been allocated for economic and social well-being. The Arab world is expected to 
have lost, by 2016, around USD 600 bn due to conflict. Countries directly affected 
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464 countries have lost 1.7% (ESCWA, 2017b:4). While conflicts in the region are 
diverse and complex, recent studies have shown that poor government effective-
ness, particularly to do with social and developmental services, have, alongside 
political exclusiveness, played a larger role than previously asserted. Similarly, 
these recent findings have also demonstrated that income inequality and poverty 
are not the root causes of the breakdown of the state in the Arab world per se, 
particularly since many countries today torn by conflicts had actually experienced 
poverty and income inequality reduction (Ianovichina, 2018:8-9). Internal con-
flicts were also internationalized according to the foreign policy priorities of many 
Agenda-committed donor countries. In this geopolitical context, for every USD 1 
the Arab region gained in development finance, it effectively lost USD 2.9 in 
direct financing (ESCWA, 2017b:8). Conflicts are also a major drain on budget as 
military expenditures in the region remains the highest in the world. Both a result 
and a cause of conflicts and violence, military spending keeps directing much 
needed resources away from socioeconomic development, environmental protec-
tion, and the reversal of environmental degradation (ESCWA, 2017b:5). 
3.2 REFUGEES
The forced displacement and migration of refugees into other countries has also 
made socioeconomic progress extremely difficult. The region today hosts the 
highest ratio (37%) worldwide of refugees as a percentage of total population 
(Dugarova and Gulasan, 2017:48). In Yemen, starvation is threatening the liveli-
hood of millions while the civil war in Syria displaced around 11 mn people (UN 
News, 2019). The presence of large displaced populations adds to the already-
existing structural constraints, such as poor or lagging infrastructure, shortage of 
teachers, and issues related to safety and security, as well as socioeconomic con-
straints such as poverty, child labor, and non-affordable housing (Government of 
Lebanon and the United Nations, 2019). Moreover, the influxes of refugees have 
revealed the volatility of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and its diver-
sion from development aid towards humanitarian and refugee aid (ESCWA, 
2017b: 3-4). Consequently, several foreign policies conducted since 2011, includ-
ing the intervention in Libya, Syria and Yemen have made donor commitments to 
the Agenda illusionary at a time when the “three D’s”, defense, development, and 
diplomacy seem all the more intertwined (Abouassi, 2010:119).
3.3 RECURRENCE 
Conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, have created persis-
tent economic costs and deep recessions. As underlined at the 2018 HLPF, “con-
flict not only impedes development. It can reverse decades of development gains 
and, in some countries, it has already done so […]” (United Nations, 2018b). 
Overall, the recurrence of conflicts is pushing millions of people into poverty 
traps and driving domestic financing towards emergency and short-term humani-
tarian needs. The recurrence of conflicts is particularly worrying when the fre-
quency and the length of these conflicts are considered. According to the IMF, 
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465(MENA) lasted more than eight years, and in about half of these episodes the 
ensuing peace lasted less than ten years. Given the significant political polariza-
tion, economic inequality, and rapid population growth in the region, these con-
flicts are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon (Rother et al. 2016:7).
3.4 FIRST AS TRAGEDY, THEN AS FARCE? 
Tracing the origins of conflicts in the Arab region leads us to the failure of states 
in establishing sustainable political consensus through “social contracts”: from 
defaulting social services, to sectarian resentment, to socioeconomic changes 
including the “frustrated development syndrome”. It is also impossible to under-
estimate the extent to which geopolitical rivalries, interventionist foreign policies, 
and white-collar arms sales have contributed to the recurrence of conflicts and an 
unprecedented refugee crisis. In such a context, two conclusions may be derived. 
The first is that the regional implementation of the Agenda needs to be contextual-
ized within a framework that addresses the root causes of conflicts as a starting 
point. The second is that North-South frameworks for implementation are elusive: 
the foreign policies of many international actors towards the Arab world contra-
dict the stated objectives of the Agenda, thereby rendering it either the subject of 
lip-service, or a “soft power” foreign policy mechanism. As one participant in a 
study by Abouassi (2010:120) perhaps correctly stated, “we are not living in a 
utopia, no one is really interested in giving assistance without linking it to a polit-
ical agenda or national interest; there is no altruism in aid assistance”. In such a 
context, local, national, and regional “domestication” of the Agenda, and the 
development of frameworks of implementation that correspond to current con-
texts is of paramount importance. In the case of the Arab world, policy action 
directed towards the achievement of all of the SDGs needs to be geared primarily 
towards addressing “key levers” for change that correspond to current needs. 
They have been identified in an extensive study published as Eruptions of Popular 
Anger by the World Bank (Ianchovichina, 2018). Through these key levers, the 
streamlining of policy action towards all of the other goals becomes possible. 
4 THE KEY LEVERS FOR CHANGE
While seeking to tackle, and duly so, poverty, gender inequality, and unemploy-
ment, governments in the Arab region would need to address, above all, the over-
arching peace gap and gear policymaking towards addressing key deficiencies that 
have led to the outbreak of conflicts. Ianchovichina (2018) asserts that perceived 
economic and social inequality, access to much-needed social services, and lack of 
inclusiveness and rule of law have contributed to the establishment of a “frustrated 
development syndrome”, primarily within a growing and increasingly educated 
middle class, leading to the breakdown of peace across the region, and rendering 
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466 4.1 REDUCING (REAL) INEQUALITIES
Despite the recurrent focus on poverty and income inequality reduction, many of 
the economic root causes that have fueled discontent in the Arab region remain 
today largely unaddressed. Many countries and governments have rushed to reac-
tive measures aimed at absorbing the shocks or preventing the crisis. The priority 
has traditionally been given to short-term responses at the expense of correcting 
long-established structural inequalities that permeate societies throughout the 
region and that transcend simple income inequality. At that level, little room is left 
for inclusive practices and for closing the wealth gap, which already stands among 
the highest in the world (Alvaredo et al., 2018:133). Moreover, if such inequality 
has been identified as a cause of unrest, several nuances are required: income ine-
quality, by itself, does not seem to have been a root cause of conflict, but broader 
inequality (income, access to jobs, social services, etc.), understood as a failing 
social contract mainly between an increasingly ambitious and educated middle 
class and a traditionally-established elite, is largely to blame (World Bank, 2015).
4.2 ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES
Complementary to the analysis pertaining to real inequalities, the findings out-
lined in Ianchovichina (2018:8) have also underlined the importance of ensuring 
outlets for the “frustrated middle class” (such as promising careers in a merito-
cratic civil service) while addressing fundamental demands that were at the heart 
of the Arab uprisings, such as affordable housing and policies promoting social 
economic justice including universal social security coverage. Factors that have 
contributed to the breakdown of the social contract in states across the Arab 
region include: 
– A decline in the perceived quality of life and a deterioration of social ser-
vices,
– The erosion and frustration of an increasingly educated middle class,
– Fiscal imbalances, burdensome subsidies, and distorted recruitment poli-
cies that were (1) either kept unchecked despite the decline in quality of 
life; or (2) remedied through unprecedented austerity measures.
4.3 EQUITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
These findings also have several ramifications in what relates to equity and the rule 
of law, which would hence need to be understood outside their strict economic or 
judicial dimensions. While initially packaged as a means to circumvent political 
exclusiveness, austerity measures have in reality been accompanied, in several 
countries, with an exacerbation of the hold of the elites on the state accompanied 
with a breakdown of structures that had provided social welfare for generations 
(ESCWA, 2017c:13). Ianchovichina (2018), who appropriately underlines the 
“frustrated development” syndrome, frames such disparities within a larger defi-
ciency related to the rule of law, namely that laws tend to apply to the middle and 
lower echelons of society, while privileges are retained by power-wielding elites, 
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467In the following section, the reasons pertaining to the inability of states to address 
these dimensions is studied from the perspective of policymaking, particularly 
that which relates to the ability of states to finance such dimensions-goals. Draw-
ing primarily on the classification proposed by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, 
domestic resources inflows and outflows, foreign private and public financing, as 
well as complex financing frameworks, are examined. Further attention is given 
evidently, considering its sheer size, to domestic resources mobilization. As out-
lined by Guterres (2018), efforts should “continue to support developing countries 
in creating conditions for mobilizing domestic resources, including tax reform and 
other good governance measures” Unfortunately, the Arab countries’ capacity to 
mobilize domestic finance towards such key levers remains crippled, thereby 
underlining the need for urgent governance reforms. Foreign sources of financing, 
it is argued, could face challenges and risks in mobilizing resources for develop-
ment before such reforms are realized. 
5 RESOURCES MOBILIZATION 
5.1  DOMESTIC RESOURCES MOBILIZATION: A CRIPPLED CAPACITY FOR 
THE KEY LEVERS
5.1.1 INFLOWS: ENDURING FISCAL PRIVILEGES
The breakdown of the social contract in the Arab world would therefore need to 
be remedied through answering several popular needs that are intrinsically related 
to inequality, social services and the rule of law. Several among those identified 
previously, including affordable housing, public transportation, healthcare, and 
schools require securing the necessary funds for public or subsidized housing as 
well as public education and healthcare, all while a reduction of real and perceived 
inequalities is sought. In theory, several domestic policy reforms would need to be 
conducted to expand the tax base, particularly through increased taxation on 
wealth, property, and capital gains, which are still negligible even when compared 
to the low global average of 7% of total tax revenue. Such steps would be essential 
for overcoming wealth confiscation, democratizing fiscal policies, and increasing 
public revenues (ESCWA, 2017c). More progressive taxation schemes throughout 
the region would also enable economic reforms, and human capital investments, 
reduce social inequalities, and lessen the impact of fluctuations in commodity 
prices (ESCWA, 2017c).
Nevertheless, such steps are and will continue to be met with resistance at both 
central and local levels (Lutz and Linder, 2012:25). Even if central governments 
agree on progressive and equitable taxation schemes particularly on large estates, 
local areas have historically shown resistance to the application of central govern-
ment laws and tax systems that circumvent, or jeopardize, traditional power struc-
tures (Gana, 2012). Even if the current post-insurrection context is theoretically 
favorable for the “buying in” of the elites, political bargaining would be essential 
(Besley and Persson, 2014:113) and the region’s recent overall record in that 
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468 The inability of traditional elites to grasp the urgency of reforming fiscal frame-
works towards more equity and towards fiscal inclusiveness has tarnished the 
legitimacy of states and of fiscal systems across the region: consequently, illicit 
financial flows (IFFs) and tax evasion have increased exponentially. Indeed, IFFs 
thrive when citizens or businesses seek to avoid taxation by deeming it unneces-
sary, when government officials divert public money for personal gain, or when 
armed or unarmed groups and terrorist organizations seek to contest the state’s 
authority by opening parallel economies (Everst-Phillips, 2012). In the Arab 
region, illicit outflows started exceeding the combined aggregate of ODA and FDI 
inflows with trade mis-invoicing estimated at a total of USD 60.3 bn per year 
between 2008 and 2015 (ESCWA, 2017b:5). 
The recent report (ESCWA, 2018a:45-46) has proposed several recommendations 
to curb IFFs including the establishment of national and multi-national bodies to 
track and curb IFFs, enhancing accountability, adopting regional and stand-alone 
laws, and requiring public country-to-country reporting by multinationals. How-
ever, two conditions are required for the control of IFFs to apply: (1) state effec-
tiveness, capability and determination; and (2) the support or neutrality of “veto-
holding” elites (Everst-Phillips, 2015). While several institutional-level policies 
such as capacity development are recommended to create institutional momentum 
outside the political realm, international practice has reiterated that these condi-
tions are intrinsically political and that the political drive is much more potent than 
the institutional one (Tilley et al., 2015: iv-v, 18-19). Consequently, the impasse is 
straightforward: privileged fiscal positions and money laundering practices that 
tarnish the legitimacy of states, thereby leading to more tax evasion and IFFs. 
5.1.2 OUTFLOWS: SOWING INSTABILITY AND INEFFICIENCY? 
Increases in military spending is not only diverting funds from socioeconomic 
development, but it is also associated with increased instability and mutual suspi-
cion, hence undoing steps towards regional integration and peace. The dual effect 
of increased military spending hence contributes to internal instability through 
de-prioritizing socioeconomic well-being and to regional instability through the 
increased risk of the recurrence of conflicts (Gaub, 2014:1). Many countries that 
have invested greatly in development aid have also played a central role in the 
exponential increase of arms flows into the region. This is exemplified by the most 
recent US arms sales to Saudi Arabia, or the fact that 60% of French arms sales 
have gone to the Middle East, doubling in 2017 alone, despite criticism from law-
makers and increasing scrutiny concerning the military operations in Yemen (Irish 
and Louet, 2018).
Moreover, the popular demand for social services is both tied, and inversely 
related to, the size of the region’s public sector wage bill, which stands at 30% of 
total expenditures compared to 14% in OECD countries (World Bank, 2016b). In 
Lebanon, the cost of central government staffing is believed to have more than 
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469civil service remains considered as the primary employer, the opportunity cost of 
which is, in fact, the funding of much-needed public services (Al-Aref, 2014). 
Moreover, the efficiency of the public sector does not explain current spending 
trends, particularly if we were to account for subsidies that largely benefit high 
income strata (Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2012:8; ESCWA, 2017a: 11-12). The second 
opportunity cost of not reforming the civil service lies in the failure to tap into its 
capacities as a post-conflict settlement-building mechanism and to defuse the 
“frustrated development syndrome” by allowing the staffing of the government 
with candidates that have both educational competencies and professional train-
ing. (United Nations, 2010: 21; UNDP, 2014: 26, 31).
From this section, several conclusions can be reached. Firstly, given their sheer 
size, it is clear that domestic resources are the most potent means of implementa-
tion, yet that political exclusiveness, particularly in matters such as taxation and 
tax evasion, are at the root of real inequalities and cripple domestic resources 
inflows towards such much-needed sectors as social services. Secondly, this polit-
ical exclusiveness is also at the root of the “frustrated development syndrome” as 
political influence in the staffing of civil services and allocation of subsidies 
remains potent, and often overlooks the large pool of educated, middle-class youth 
on one hand, and the capacity of civil services to act as brokers of reconciliation 
and consensus-building. Thirdly, if resources are to be mobilized for the achieve-
ment of this priority framework, then political systems will inevitably need to 
become more inclusive or suffer the cost of recurrent and persistent instability and 
conflicts. In this coming section, we look at the potential of foreign and complex 
financing mechanisms as means of mobilizing resources for development, and 
argue that given the most recent turn in Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
and lagging regulatory frameworks, these financing mechanisms will need to “be 
driven” by domestic resources mobilization, rather than the opposite. 
5.2  FOREIGN AND COMPLEX FINANCING MECHANISMS:  
IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF DOMESTIC RESOURCES MOBILIZATION
5.2.1 FOREIGN FINANCING
Since 2010, increases in ODA have been mainly attributed to increasing humani-
tarian aid and in-donor refugee costs while ODA to non-emergency situations fell 
considerably. The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia – ESCWA 
(2017b: 3-4.7) confirms that in 2015, humanitarian aid from OECD-DAC coun-
tries increased by 11% (USD 13.6 bn) while refugee aid constituted nearly 10% of 
total ODA, thereby doubling to USD 12 bn. Moreover, in 2014 and 2015, the total 
amount of ODA received by the Arab region from the rest of the world was less 
than what the region gave in return as ODA outflows. Moreover, only 36% of the 
total ODA provided by Arab development funds in 2015 was received by coun-
tries of the region. 
Moreover, the Arab world has become highly unattractive for foreign investment 


































































43 (4) 459-476 (2019)
470 relatively low in the region, averaging 1.7% of GDP when compared with 2.9% 
worldwide; 6.39% in Lebanon, and 2.04% in Egypt (Abaza, 2016: 61). The vast 
majority of investment is still short-term oriented and most FDIs have been 
directed towards low technology sectors that generate few new jobs: oil, real 
estate and construction. Since FDIs require competitive business environments, 
peace and stability to maintain in the long run, it is also unlikely that FDI will 
become a source for the achievement of the domains-goals outlined above, par-
ticularly since local governments are often unable to borrow, and across develop-
ing countries, are still considered not creditworthy. 
While the private sector can bring cost-efficient solutions, it is also often associ-
ated with higher financing costs because most investors demand a competitive 
return for the risk they assume. Tax and other incentives designed to attract FDI 
ought to be viewed with caution, as they are often used at the expense of generat-
ing public revenue. Emphasis should theoretically be placed on long-term meas-
ures that do not involve forgoing revenue, and that would include combating cor-
ruption, establishing flexible regulatory frameworks and an equitable judicial 
environment. In the current situation, the combined framework of these prerequi-
sites is not established in most countries across the MENA region, with the excep-
tion of some of the oil-rich Gulf States. 
5.2.2 COMPLEX FINANCING FRAMEWORKS: THE LONG SHOT? 
While public-private partnerships (PPPs) offer promising frameworks as they 
allow for risk sharing and the possibility of benefiting from the private sector’s 
management and efficiency, the public sector’s involvement can also allow for the 
streamlining of labor laws while providing private capital with a certain margin of 
risk sharing. Nevertheless, PPPs require comprehensive regulatory frameworks 
that mitigate risks such as unclear delineation of responsibilities between the pub-
lic and private actors (World Bank, 2016a); efficient and effective public institu-
tions and administrative capacities that are capable of acting as partners as well as 
managers; and independent judiciary oversight to uphold constitutional rights, 
thereby disallowing corporate takeover or actions that contradict domestic and 
local laws. 
While blended financing (Harvey, 2018) by multilateral development banks 
(MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) is being increasingly used in 
some countries of the Arab world (Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2015: 59), it 
remains prone to issues related to risk and return. Project returns may not be 
enough to cover the risks originally incurred by financing institutions. If green 
financing is increasingly being used to “localize sustainable development”, most 
particularly on the environmental level, (United Nations, 2018a: 94) local admin-
istrations in most countries of the Arab region have limited capacities to operate 
or implement green and climate financing projects. Such projects consequently 
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471It is therefore clear that while foreign and complex sources of financing can direct 
resources towards several action areas that would benefit from both foreign tech-
nical assistance and funding, as well as the efficiency of the private sector, both 
local and foreign, such sources require competitive business environments as well 
as environmentally and fair trade-geared legislative and legal frameworks that can 
curb relations of dependency. Functioning and effective institutions that can 
ensure tax collection are also required. Nevertheless, as long as domestic resources 
mobilization remains crippled, such an infrastructure cannot be developed, if only 
for the fluctuations in ODAs, FDIs and remittances; and as long as political exclu-
siveness is maintained, domestic resources mobilization is likely to continue suf-
fering from financial drains, waste and inefficiency. 
6 CONCLUSION
Despite its adoption as the central international development framework, Agenda 
2030 needs to be contextualized in order for it to become achievable in the regions 
and countries it will service. Its translation into a workable model is threatened by 
the prevalence of interventionism and geopolitical dynamics on one hand, and poor 
contextualization on the other. In this article, we have attempted to bridge the inter-
national development literature and the current context, and identify the key levers 
for policy action in the Arab world that could serve as entry points for the achieve-
ment and the streamlining of the SDGs. By analyzing the impediments pertaining 
to the mobilization of these levers, we have underlined the observation that domes-
tic resources mobilization remains crippled due to several limitations at the level of 
inflows and outflows. The overarching cause of these limitations is political (and 
economic) exclusiveness, namely the inability of political establishments to grasp 
the pressing need for the democratization of fiscal and financial systems in order to 
create a political consensus sufficient to reduce illicit financial flows on one hand, 
and the immense potential that the reduction of military spending and subsidies 
coupled with the recruitment of the educated youth hold for peacebuilding. 
On the other hand, policies that would promote political and economic inclusive-
ness, particularly fiscally and financially, are expected to allow for the creation of 
a greater pool of resources that could be immediately put at the service of the “key 
levers”, thereby realizing progress on directly-related SDGs but also allowing for 
the establishment of “entry points” and silo-breakdown towards the achievement 
of all other SDGs. While recognizing the inherent complexity of addressing con-
flict and peacebuilding in the region, this article presents, in the annex, a summary 
of this analysis and a “roadmap”. By undertaking several incremental fiscal, finan-
cial, civil service and military-spending related reforms, Arab states could estab-
lish long-term social development programs that reduce inequalities, improve 
socioeconomic welfare and access to much-needed social services, and promote 
the rule of law. 
Curbing illicit financial flows and trade misinvoicing could be achieved by focus-
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472 of national cohesion and inclusiveness, which can be remedied through cross-
sectoral policymaking such as civil service reform, the establishment of quotas 
and meritocratic considerations. Encouraging all constituencies to take part in 
public procurement would also reduce incentives for white-collar tax evasion – 
measures that can be complemented with more thorough clearance, control and 
investigation procedures.
Finally, foreign financing, whether foreign direct investment, official develop-
ment assistance or remittances, given their fluctuating natures, is more suited to 
follow improvements in domestic resources mobilization than to lead them. The 
most recently acclaimed international financing mechanisms including public-
private partnerships, blended financing, and green financing, may yield socioeco-
nomic gains yet require legislations, public sector capacities, tax levying enforce-
ment, and infrastructures that are currently inadequate to properly oversee, facili-
tate, or manage, such mechanisms. It is therefore imperative for many states in the 
Arab region to recognize that political and economic exclusiveness comes with a 
heavy price tag that cannot be paid in the long term.
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